In a wide variety of economic contexts, collections of single-object auctions are used to allocate multiple substitutable goods. This paper studies how such collections of auctions aggregate into a multi-object auction market. We identify two features of auction-market design that enhance expected market efficiency: the individual auctions should be conducted in sequence, and information about all of the objects in the sequence should be revealed up front to the bidders. We then show that such an auction market is approximately efficient: specifically, its expected inefficiency is bounded above by the expected efficiency gain associated with adding one more bidder.
I. Introduction
In a wide variety of economic contexts, collections of single-object auctions are used to allocate multiple imperfectly substitutable objects. One important example is government procurement (e.g., highway construction): typically, each contract is allocated via its own sealed-bid auction, even though contracts are likely to be substitutable for suppliers due to capacity constraints.
Another well-known example is the online auctioneer eBay, which uses the same single-object auction design for goods with substitutes, such as used automobiles and event tickets, as it does for the one-of-a-kind collectibles for which it was originally designed. Other examples include real-estate auctions, wine auctions, timber auctions, and offline wholesale used-auto auctions. This paper studies how such collections of single-object auctions "aggregate up" into what we will call a (multi-object) auction market. Two features of auction-market design are remarkably constant among successful auction markets and often absent in failed ones. First, the individual auctions are organized so that bidders can easily participate in them in sequence.
Second, the auctioneer provides information to bidders about the entire sequence of auctions known to him; that is, bidders know about future auctions when they must make decisions in current auctions. We show that each of these features enhances the expected allocative efficiency of the market as a whole. We then show that the market with auctions sequenced and information revealed, although not fully efficient, in a certain sense approximates full efficiency. That is, in our setting, an appropriately designed collection of single-object auctions generates nearly the same social surplus as would a more complicated but fully efficient combinatorial auction, such as Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG). 1 We begin by extending existing sequential auction theory (Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1994 , Milgrom & Weber 2000 to characterize the equilibrium of the sequential auction with future objects revealed. Our model is simple: n bidders participate in a sequence of two second-price sealed-bid auctions.
2 Bidders regard the objects as imperfect substitutes in the sense that they have different valuations of each object and unit capacity; for example, a consumer buying a used automobile on eBay values different cars differently and requires at most one car. Our main technical contribution is a proof that this dynamic game has an intuitive symmetric pure-strategy 1 We do not model the choice between combinatorial auctions and collections of single-object auctions, which intuition suggests involves numerous tradeoffs. Instead, we focus on the efficiency of collections of single-object auctions, which we view as important in its own right due to the prevalence of such market institutions in practice. 2 The restriction to two objects is for tractability, and is commonly made in sequential auction settings (Black and de Meza 1992 , Katzman 1999 , Gale and Hausch 1994 .
Bayes-Nash equilibrium in which participants bid their value for today's auction less a term that represents their expected surplus from tomorrow's auction-the opportunity cost of winning today. However, the expected surplus function itself is surprisingly subtle. The issue is that today's winning bid conveys information about the set of participating bidders in tomorrow's auction: since all bidders reduce their bids today as a function of their values of tomorrow's object, losing to a lower bid today makes higher competition tomorrow more likely. At the margin, each bidder therefore needs to assess the opportunity cost of winning today not only as a function of his valuation of tomorrow's object, but also as a function of the bid he submits today.
Following Che and Gale (1998) , we characterize the equilibrium surplus function in terms of isobids-sets of bidder types that submit the same first-round bid. The isobids turn out to be well behaved, facilitating the analysis of the comparative statics and the allocative efficiency of the auction. Surprisingly, the equilibrium involves first-stage trade almost surely, a consequence of the informational content of winning the first auction akin to the "loser's curse" (Holt and Sherman 1994, Pesendorfer and Swinkels 1997) .
Having characterized the sequential auction with future objects revealed, we next turn to results about its efficiency relative to other auction-market designs. Our first efficiency result shows that revealing future objects increases the ex-ante expected efficiency of the sequence of auctions. Specifically, we compare the sequential auction with future objects revealed to a sequential auction with future objects hidden, first analyzed by Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) .
When future objects are hidden, bidders know a second auction will occur and know the distribution of potential valuations in the second auction, but they do not yet know their own specific valuations. The reason why we might expect the information about future objects to enhance efficiency is that informed bidders allocate their demand better across auctions: bidders with high values tomorrow can bid cautiously today, and bidders with low values tomorrow can bid aggressively today. We find that there are always some realizations of bidder values where revealing future objects lowers efficiency, but revealing future objects is indeed good for social welfare when averaged over all possible bidder valuations. 3 Our proof utilizes a classic idea from the theory of single-object auctions with entry, namely, that the expected individual surplus of a participating bidder in a standard auction is equal to his expected contribution to social surplus (McAfee and McMillan, 1987) . In our sequential context, self-interested bidders shade their firstround bids precisely by their conditional expectation of second-round individual surplus, which we show is equal to their expected contribution to second-round social surplus. Thus, whenever the winner of the first object is not the bidder who values it most, society is better off in expectation with that "highest valuation" bidder participating in the second auction instead.
Our second efficiency result shows that regardless of information about the second object, sequencing itself increases the expected efficiency of the collection of auctions. We compare the sequential auction to an auction marketplace in which multiple individual auctions are separated, forcing each bidder to choose just one auction to participate in. For instance, imagine that the auctions take place simultaneously in separate rooms. Intuitively, we expect sequencing to be good for efficiency because it allows bidders to participate in more auctions;
any bidder who loses the first auction can then participate in the second. As with the case of hidden future objects, it is always possible to find realizations of bidder values where running the auctions simultaneously-hence forcing bidders to choose ex-ante which one auction to participate in-actually increases allocative efficiency. But in expectation, we show that this kind of marketplace congestion is always bad for welfare.
Our last result shows that the sequential auction with future objects revealed is in a certain sense approximately efficient. More specifically, we show that the expected inefficiency of the sequential auction with future objects revealed is bounded above by the expected efficiency gain associated with adding one more bidder to the second auction. This bound is in the style of Bulow and Klemperer's (1996) bound on the revenue gain from using an optimally set reserve price. An interpretation is that the potential welfare gains from switching to a more sophisticated multi-object auction, such as VCG, are small in this environment.
Sequencing auctions and revealing future objects both seem like obvious design decisions in the context of auction markets for substitutes. Both practices have long been standard, for instance, at the classic auction houses Sotheby's and Christie's. Yet many real-life auction markets fail to do one or both of these things. For instance, the now-defunct Amazon and Yahoo auction marketplaces used soft-close ending times, meaning an auction ends only after some time elapses without a new bid (Roth and Ockenfels, 2001 ). This design made it difficult for bidders to guess which of two auctions would end first, and hence difficult to participate in both. Google
Base's auctions-also defunct-were sorted by search-term closeness-of-fit rather than by ending time, making identifying, let alone participating in, the full sequence difficult for bidders.
Moving against our efficiency result, in 2008 eBay switched from sorting auctions strictly by ending time ("Ending Soonest") to a sort order based on a variety of features ("Best Match");
interestingly, eBay appears to have at least partly switched back in some product categories.
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Large wholesale car auctions in the United States often conduct several auctions concurrently, each in a separate "lane" (Tadelis and Zettlemeyer, 2011) . Perhaps the starkest example of a nonsequential auction is that run by the event-ticket marketplace StubHub in 2006 for all of the tickets to a single event. Its single-object auction design was similar to eBay's, but the auctions all had identical hard-close ending times. 5 Auctions at charity benefits are often organized similarly to StubHub's, which might explain why the final moments of so-called "silent auctions" are often anything but.
Perhaps the starkest example of an auction with future objects hidden is that described by Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) , in which future items in an equipment auction are hidden behind a curtain until their turn for sale. The field experiment reported by Tadelis and Zettlemeyer (2011) relates to improving the disclosure of information about objects in the sequence, specifically releasing more information about automobiles' quality condition. Some gimmicky online auction sites with very short auction durations (e.g., Bidz.com) seem to purposefully suppress information about future objects for sale. 6 One could also interpret the non-sequential sort used by Google Base and eBay's "Best Match" as obscuring information about the full set of objects for sale.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium of the sequential auction with future objects revealed.
Section 4 presents our three main results: on information, sequencing, and approximate efficiency. Section 5 concludes. 4 We searched for event tickets and cars on eBay in June 2011. In the event tickets category (e.g., search term "U2 Tickets"), the default "Best Match" display sorted upcoming auction listings in strict order of ending time. In the automobiles category, the default "Best Match" display seemed to place little weight on auction ending time. For instance, for the search terms "Ford F150" and "Toyota Corolla", we found that in 78 percent of our searches (conducted once per day for one week), at least one of the three auctions ending soonest was not shown in the top 25 "Best Match" listings. In 42 percent of the searches, none of the three was. 5 The StubHub auction's average selling price was $50 per ticket, versus a $148 average aftermarket value for tickets for that particular tour. Some of the StubHub auctions closed at prices as low as $3 per ticket. Nevertheless, StubHub's CEO described the auction as a "successful experiment in true dynamic pricing." See Cohen and Grossweiner (2006) . 6 On Bidz.com, "auctions start at $1 every 5 seconds!" The company has been accused of fraud and faced numerous other difficulties (Miniter, 2008) .
II. Model
The supply side of the market consists of two objects j=1, 2 for sale. The value the seller of object j derives from keeping her object is normalized to zero. 
Taxonomy of auction markets:
We define an auction market as a set of single-object auctions. For tractability, we focus on markets that sell each object by second-price sealed-bid auction without a reserve. We classify each possible market in terms of the timing of the individual auctions, and the information available to the bidders about their private valuations of the objects: the two auctions are either sequential or separate, and information about the full set of auctions in the market is either revealed or hidden by the auctioneer. We now define and discuss these two dimensions of our taxonomy.
In sequential auctions, all bidders participate first in auction 1, the winner (if any) exits the market, and then the remaining bidders participate in auction 2. 7 In separate auctions, each bidder chooses which one auction to participate in; bidders are not allowed / able to participate in both auctions. For instance, imagine that the auctions take place simultaneously in separate rooms.
When information is revealed, each bidder i learns his valuation of both objects before he makes any bidding or entry decisions. When information is hidden, each bidder i learns his value for object j only at the time of its auction. Specifically: in the sequential auction, bidder i learns only his first-round value before he must make his first-round bid; in the separate auctions, bidder i learns his value for the one auction he enters only after he has made his entry decision.
The separated condition can be interpreted more broadly as a tractable device for modeling an auction market in which there are obstacles to participating in multiple individual auctions. The hidden condition can be interpreted more broadly as a modeling convention that captures that auction buyers know they will have future opportunities to trade but are not yet sure of the exact details of these opportunities. Table 1 shows the equilibrium bidding strategies for each market design in the taxonomy, conditioning on bidder i entering auction j. Not all bidders enter all auctions: in separate auctions, each bidder enters only one auction by construction. In sequential auctions, the winner of the first auction does not enter the second auction because of the unit capacity constraint. Each cell also highlights which assumption is sufficient for each result.
III. Bidding strategies
In all but one market design in the taxonomy, the bidding strategies are standard results:
the separate auctions are isolated from each other, so bidding one's valuation is a dominant strategy (Vickrey, 1961) . For the same reason, the losers of the first auction (j=1) in any sequential setting bid their valuations v i2 in the second auction. The dominant strategy in the second stage means that we do not need to make any assumptions about information disclosure 7 The assumption that the winner of auction 1 exits the market is most reasonable when disposal is costly or prohibited. For instance, the winner of a procurement auction may be prohibited from transferring the contract, and resale of a used car bought on eBay is costly due to eBay fees and other transactions costs.
should they lose the first auction. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1994) shows that it is an iterated conditional dominant strategy equilibrium for bidder i to bid her valuation v i1 net of this expected surplus S in the first auction. The assumption of independence across objects (A2) is sufficient to make this argument go through. Under the more general assumption A1, each bidder would have a different belief about the competition in the second auction. 
The choice-of-auction stage of the separate auction markets with information revealed raises an interesting coordination problem whereby each bidder wants to both enter an auction for which he has a high valuation, but also an auction that other bidders do not want to enter. As with any coordination game, the choice stage thus has multiple equilibria. Our efficiency ranking results below will be valid for any perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the separate-auction game.
Therefore, we do not explicitly analyze the equilibria of the choice-of-auction stage.
Bidding in sequential auctions with information revealed
The main technical contribution of this paper is characterizing the first-stage bidding strategy in the Sequential&Revealed markets. 9 Our analysis is under the more general assumption A1. We restrict our attention to strictly monotone symmetric pure-strategy equilibria, where "monotone"
means that the first-auction bids increase in v 1 for every fixed v 2 , and "strictly" rules out pooling at the same bid level for a range of different v 1 's. As in the Sequential&Hidden markets discussed in the previous paragraph, participation in the second stage yields a non-negative 
When the S function is well behaved (i.e., when   2 1 , 0 S v L  , S is continuous, and S does not decrease in c 1 faster than unity), the following first-order condition characterizes the best response to S:
The received theory of sequential auctions for substitutes focuses either on auctions of several identical units of a good (Milgrom and Weber 2000 , Black and de Meza 1992 , Katzman 1999 , on auctions of heterogeneous goods without information about future goods (Engelbrecht-Wiggans 1994), on the special case with only two bidders (Gale and Hausch 1994) , or on vertically differentiated goods (Beggs and Graddy 1997) . 10 Please see the Appendix for details of why the three conditions on S are sufficient for the FOC to characterize best responses. The argument is straightforward and relies on the Intermediate Value Theorem.
The best response function is intuitive given the truth-revealing property of the second-price auction: the bidder bids her value of the first object net of the opportunity cost of winning, where the opportunity cost of winning the first auction is not being able to participate in the second auction. When evaluating the option value of the second auction, the bidder assumes she loses the first stage to a competitive bid that exactly matches her first bid. This is the only situation in which changing her first bid slightly changes the outcome of the game, and  
We include the proof of Proposition 1 in the main body of the paper because the concept of an equilibrium isobid is central to our equilibrium and its properties. 
where X and Y are the pertinent areas under the isobid illustrated in Figure 1 . I v  is the integrated probability of winning the second auction-a standard result in auction theory:
where the second equality follows from integration by parts. Plugging equation (5) The intuition for Proposition 1 is that the isobid for bid-level β implies a belief about secondstage competition, which in turn implies the isobid via
In Bayes-Nash equilibrium, this belief must be correct. Considering isobids instead of directly solving for the bidding function involves a useful dimension reduction: equation (4) shows that an isobid for each bid level depends only on itself and not on the isobids for any other bid levels. This dimension reduction follows from thinking at the margin: each bidder needs to consider only those other bidders that bid exactly the same amount on the first object.
Figure 1: Illustration of an isobid
Proposition 1 implies a surprising property of any strictly monotone equilibrium, namely,
Bids below L 1 are ruled out because the dashed line in Figure 1 cannot satisfy the equilibrium condition: consider the bidder   1 , L z at the intersection of the dashed isobid curve of some bid-level w<L 1 and the lower boundary of the valuation support: at the margin (under the curve), she is guaranteed to lose the second auction by encountering only stronger competitors, so her best response to the dashed curve is to not shade her first-stage bid below her valuation 1 1 v L  , which is a higher first-stage bid level than the bid-level 
The equilibrium can be characterized by a unique set of equilibrium isobids   , S is continuous, and S does not decrease in c 1 faster than unity. Third, we note that equation (2) characterizes the best response to a well-behaved S and the resulting bidding function is increasing in v 1 , so the candidate isobids are indeed the equilibrium isobids.
The most notable property of the equilibrium is that all bidders bid at least L 1 , regardless of their v 2 . In other words, the equilibrium second-stage surplus vanishes as the bid-level c 1 approaches the lower bound of the support L 1 , even when the v 2 is large relative to the competition, for example, when v 2 = H 2 . The L 1 isobid is thus a constant function  
From the perspective of the bidders, an L 1 candidate isobid   curvature of zero at L 2 ). Therefore, the cascade unravels, the    
competitors bid a small amount strictly greater than L 1 , and the focal bidder   1 2 , v v thus also bids strictly more than L 1 . This unraveling corrects for the loser's curse that would result from bidding L 1 .
One way to understand the bidding incentives is to think of the first auction as an auction with a common value component arising from the fact that the opportunity cost of winning the first auction depends on the types of the other bidders. Since losing to a lower bid today makes higher competition tomorrow more likely, the common value component implies a "loser's curse" (Holt and Sherman 1994, Pesendorfer and Swinkels 1997) in that a failure to anticipate the informational content of winning makes one bid too low. Specifically, ignoring the information about tomorrow's competition contained in losing to a very low bid today would make some bidders bid very low, only to be surprised tomorrow at the intensity of competition.
The first step of the proof (existence and uniqueness of candidate isobids) relies on showing that a K-times repetition of the mapping on the space of functions defined by the RHS of equation (4) is a contraction mapping, so there is a natural numerical method for computing isobids:
Corollary to Theorem 1 (numerical procedure for computing  
The following steps can be used to numerically approximate   
IV. Efficiency bounds and rankings
Having characterized the equilibrium bidding in a Sequential&Revealed market, we now turn to results about its efficiency. We present two sets of results: First, we show that the Sequential&Revealed market generates greater expected surplus than any other market format in our taxonomy. Second, we show that the Sequential&Revealed market in a certain sense approximates full efficiency. Both sets of results rely on our workhorse finding that the Sequential&Revealed market is more efficient than the greedy allocation, defined as follows:
The greedy allocation assigns the first object to the bidder with the highest v 1 , and assigns the second object to the bidder with the highest v 2 among the remaining bidders. 
Theorem 2: Under the distributional assumption A1 and for any number of bidders N ≥ 3, the unique monotone symmetric pure-strategy Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the sequential auction with future objects revealed generates greater expected social surplus than the greedy allocation.

Proof of Theorem 2: Let
The expected social surplus with the auctions separated is bounded by assuming that all bidders other than A enter the second auction: 
x be the cdf of a v 2 drawn randomly from below the B isobid. Therefore,
The difference between the two expected social surpluses is . The critical insight is that this difference is of the same form as the equilibrium bidding function in equation (2), except the "expected surplus" part (the integral) considers N-1 rather than N-2 opponents (see equation 6). Since more opponents imply smaller surplus, the first inequality follows, so the expected seq sep W W  difference exceeds the B's first-auction bid. Therefore,
Together with the trivial observation (under assumption A2) that sequencing increases efficiency when information is hidden, Theorems 2 and 3 indicate that the sequential auction with future objects revealed is the most efficient auction market in our taxonomy: is bounded above by the expected social surplus in an economy without the unit-capacity constraint, in which each object is allocated to the bidder who values it the most: is bounded below by the greedy allocation that awards the first object to the bidder who values it the most, but then excludes that bidder from the second auction. Under assumption A2, the greedy expected surplus is:
Combining the above two bounds with n=N yields
Combining the above two bounds with n=N+1 yields
The first part of Theorem 4 says that the inefficiency of the entire two-auction sequence is less than the efficiency loss in the second auction, held in isolation, if N-1 rather than N bidders participated in it. This bound becomes tighter as the population variance in v 2 decreases and/or as N increases. Intuitively, the less expected bidder surplus the second auction provides, the more efficient is the sequential auction with information revealed. The second part of Theorem 4 says that a designer concerned about efficiency would rather hold the sequential auction with information revealed than use VCG if the former attracts just a single additional bidder-for example, due to its comparative simplicity. This bound is in the spirit of Bulow and Klemperer (1996) , who show in the single-object setting that the revenue benefit of an optimally chosen reserve price is smaller than the revenue benefit of adding one more bidder to the game. 
V. Conclusion
This paper studies how single-object auctions "aggregate up" into a multi-object auction market.
Such markets are especially prevalent in settings where there would be large coordination or complexity costs associated with adopting a fully efficient multi-object auction-for example, the costs of coordinating multiple different sellers on eBay or at Sotheby's. We identify two aspects of such auction-market design that unambiguously increase expected marketplace efficiency in our model: First, the individual auctions should be conducted in a sequence;
Second, the auctioneer should reveal to the bidders in advance all information about the objects being auctioned. Besides demonstrating that the sequential auction with future objects revealed is more efficient than its alternatives, we also show that its expected efficiency is close to the efficient social surplus. Specifically, the market designer would rather run the sequential auction with future objects revealed than run a fully efficient mechanism but lose one bidder. Together, our results help explain the prevalence of the sequential auction with future objects revealed in practice.
The efficiency ranking results validate the standard government practice of sequencing procurement auctions and announcing upcoming contracts far in advance (Jofre-Bonet and Therefore, our results suggest that eBay should go back to ordering its auctions by "Ending Soonest" and perhaps work even harder to find alternative auctions for bidders to participate in.
To assess the impact of sequencing and information on efficiency, we extended the auction literature by characterizing the first-stage bidding in the sequential auction with future objects revealed. We show that for any distribution with a density and full support on a compact rectangle, there always exists a unique strictly monotone pure-strategy equilibrium with mostly intuitive properties: bidders bid their private values of today's object minus the expected surplus of tomorrow's auction, where the expected surplus function increases convexly in the valuation of tomorrow's unit and, less obviously, depends on the valuation of today's unit. The main counterintuitive property of the equilibrium is that all bidders bid somewhat aggressively in the first stage; specifically, they bid at least the lower bound of the support of the first-object valuations. In the equilibrium, losing to a very small bid implies very strong second-round competition; rational bidders correct for this "loser's curse."
A limitation of our analysis is that it focuses on the case of just two auctions and a fixed set of bidders. It would be desirable to allow for a longer (perhaps infinite) sequence of auctions, and to allow bidders to arrive and depart from the market at different times. Unfortunately, such analysis quickly becomes intractable due to the asymmetry and learning issues first raised in the seminal paper of Milgrom and Weber (2000) ; 13 as is clear from our characterization in Section 3, even the case of two auctions and a fixed set of bidders is quite involved. Our intuition is that our efficiency results would be robust to longer sequences, but this remains conjecture.
We close by noting an interpretation of our analysis that suggests a fruitful direction for future research. In the context of online marketplaces (cf. Levin, 2011) , , v v v , and suppose further that only the winner and the price p 1 of the first unit are revealed before the second stage. Then second-stage bidders have asymmetric beliefs about the v 3 of the remaining competitors, because one of the remaining bidders bid exactly p 1 , whereas the other bidders bid strictly below p 1 . Even when this asymmetry is resolved by revealing all first-stage bids, as suggested by Milgrom and Weber (2000) , the information about future goods would make it necessary to explicitly model second-stage beliefs about v 3 : first-stage bids would be a function of v 3 , and bidders thus may have an incentive to mislead their competitors into thinking their v 3 is very high by bidding very low in the first stage. Furthermore, the price p 1 would enter second-stage bids, so the last two auctions do not reduce to the environment studied here. Thus, even with just three auctions it is unclear whether there exist intuitive pure-strategy equilibria. 
is sufficient for concavity of   
Proof of Theorem 1
We construct the equilibrium in three steps:
1) The full support and boundedness of f imply that for every   2) The set of candidate isobids   
